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TITLE VII - EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION - TITLE VII 
PROVIDES CLAIM FOR LAW FIRM ASSOCIATE ALLEGING 
SEX DISCRIMINATION IN PARTNERSHIP SELECTION. Hishon 
v. King & Spalding, 104 S. Ct. 2229 (1984). 
After graduating from law school in 1972, a female attorney was 
employed as an associate! by a large Atlanta law firm.2 In 1979, when 
the firm failed to select her for partner,3 she filed a charge with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission4 alleging that the firm had dis-
criminated against her on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act. 5 The Commission issued a notice of right to sue, and 
the attorney brought an action against the firm in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Georgia. 6 The district court dis-
missed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,7 holding that 
l. Appellant's Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Hishon v. King & Spalding, 104 S. 
Ct. 2229 (1984). The female attorney graduated from Columbia University with 
honors. When hired in 1972, she was the second female lawyer employed by the law 
firm. The only woman previously hired had been a permanent associate for 44 
years. [d. 
2. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 104 S. Ct. 2229, 2232 (1984). The law firm is organized 
as a general partnership under Georgia law. In 1980 when the female attorney filed 
suit the firm had approximately 50 active partners, and about 50 associates. [d. 
3. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1024 (lIth Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 
2229 (1984). An associate's employment is terminated if the associate is not elected 
to become a partner in accordance with the firm's "up or out" policy. [d. 
4. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 104 S. Ct. 2229, 2232 (1984). 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(b), 
(e) (1982) requires that a party must first file a charge with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission within 180 days of the violation as a condition precedent 
to Title VII litigation. See generally A. LARSON & L. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DIs-
CRIMINATION § 49.30-.32 (1983) (discussing the procedural requirements for an in-
dividual filing a private suit under Title VII). 
5. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.c. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982). 42 
U.S.c. § 2000e-2(a) states: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(I) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individ-
ual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his 
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin. 
The Act defines an "employer" as any "person" engaged in an industry affecting 
commerce and who has IS or more employees. [d. § 2000e(b). Partnerships are 
included in the definition of "person." [d. § 2000e(a). 
6. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1303 (N.D. Ga. 1980), 
affd, 678 F.2d 1022 (lIth Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2229 (1984). 
7. [d. at 1307. Granting a motion to dismiss is proper only when the federal court 
lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action. FED. R. CIy. P. (l2)(b)(I). A mo-
tion to dismiss could have been made under FED. R. CIY. P. 12(b)(6), for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. This would have required the court 
to examine the law and determine whether it could provide relief in the female attor-
ney's situation. See generally 5 C. WRIGHT & S. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE §§ 1350, 1356 (1969) (explaining the purpose and proper application of 
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partnership selection was not within the "scope" of Title VII.8 The dis-
trict court reasoned that a discrimination suit against a partnership 
would conflict with the partnership's constitutional right to freedom of 
association.9 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the 
decision, \0 concluding that in the absence of a clear congressional man-
date Title VII should not infringe on "matters of voluntary association" 
such as legal partnerships. I I An unanimous Supreme Court reversed. 12 
It held that in the female attorney's case, the opportunity to become part-
ner was a "term, condition, or privilege" of her employment as an associ-
ate; Title VII therefore provided her with a cognizable claim. 13 
Courts have broadly interpreted Title VII to prohibit discrimination 
in employment opportunities on the basis of race, religion, sex, and na-
tional origin. 14 Early judicial efforts at enforcing Title VII were aimed 
primarily at lower level jobs. IS The legislative history indicates, however, 
the above discussed motions and cautioning against confusing a motion under Rule 
12(b)(1) with a motion under Rule 12(b)(6)). 
8. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1303, 1306 (N.D. Ga. 
1980), affd, 678 F.2d 1022 (11th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2229 (1984). 
9. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1303, 1304-05 (N.D. 
Ga. 1980) (the court acknowledged that it may have erred in reaching its conclu-
sion), affd, 678 F.2d 1022 (11th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2229 (1984). The court 
stated: 
/d. 
In a very real sense a professional partnership is like a marriage. It is, 
in fact, nothing less than a "business marriage" for better or worse. Just 
as in marriage different brides bring different qualitities [sic] into the union 
- some beauty, some money, and some character - so also in profes-
sional partnerships, new matters or partners are sought and betrothed for 
different reasons and to serve different needs of the partnership. Some new 
partners bring legal skills, others bring clients. Still others bring personal-
ity and negotiating skills. In both, new mates are expected to bring not 
only ability and industry, but also moral character, fidelity, trustworthi-
ness, loyalty, personality and love. Unfortunately, however, in partner-
ships, as in matrimony, these needed, worthy and desirable qualities are 
not necessarily divided evenly among the applicants according to race, 
age, sex or religion, and in some they just are not present at all. To use or 
apply Title VII to coerce a mismatched or unwanted partnership too 
closely resembles a statute for the enforcement of shotgun weddings. 
10. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022 (11th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2229 
(1984). 
11. /d. at 1026. 
12. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 104 S. Ct. 2229 (1984). 
13. /d. at 2236. The case was remanded to provide the attorney with "her day in 
court." Id. For the pertinent text of Title VII, see supra note 5. 
14. See, e.g., County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 178 (1981) (Title VII 
intended to be broadly inclusive); Franks v. Bowman Trans. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 753 
(1976) (Congress intended to prohibit all practices in whatever form that create 
inequality in employment opportunity); Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th 
Cir. 1971) (Title VII must be given the broadest possible interpretation); EEOC v. 
Rinella & Rinella, 401 F. Supp. 175, 182 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (the remedial nature of 
Title VII requires a flexible construction of the statute for jurisdictional purposes). 
15. See, e.g., Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972) (discrimina-
tory practices found in a discretionary transfer system from hourly to salaried pro-
duction line positions); Bowie v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 
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that Congress intended Title VII to apply to professional occupations. 16 
Thus, when claims of discrimination in higher level jobs met with hostil-
ity,17 Congress amended Title VII to clarify its intent and broaden Title 
VII's scope. IS Congress explicitly extended the protection of Title VII to 
professional situations, including academic institutions and government 
employment. 19 Indeed, when an amendment to exclude hospitals and 
their staffs was proposed, Senator Javits stated that the amendment 
would strip professionals of a remedy for employment discrimination 
contrary to Congress's intent. 20 The proposal was defeated. 2 I 
Despite the expansive interpretation of Title VII taken by Congress, 
several courts continued to limit the statute's application in professional 
employment. 22 One method courts used was to require the existence of 
1969) (weight-lifting restrictions on women plant workers were not bona fide occu-
pational qualifications justifying a bifurcated seniority system); Weeks v. Southern 
Bell Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969) (employer had the burden of proving 
that denying a woman a switchman's position was nondiscriminatory). See gener-
ally Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV. 
947, 949-50 (1982) (discussing the history of Title VII). 
16. See Amicus Curiae Brief at 17, Hishon v. King & Spalding, 104 S. Ct. 2229 (1984) 
(United States and EEOC supporting reversal) (citing H.R. REP. No. 914 (pt. 2), 
88th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1963) (separate views of Rep. McCulloch and others envi-
sioning that Title VII would apply to "teachers, doctors, lawyers, scientists, and 
engineers"». 
17. See, e.g., Allen v. City of Mobile, 466 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (up-
holding validity of test used for promotion to police officer without examining its 
discriminatory effect), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909 (1973); Buckner v. Goodyear Tire 
& Rubber Co., 339 F. Supp. 1108 (N.D. Ala. 1972) (examining apprenticeship and 
testing program's impact on promotional opportunities for black employees); 
Chance v. Board of Examiners, 330 F. Supp. 203 (S.D. N.Y. 1971) (examining the 
fairness and validity of testing procedures for supervisory positions that had a dis-
criminatory effect on blacks and Puerto Ricans), affd, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972). 
18. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.c. § 2000e (1964) (expressly ex-
cluded "the United States, ... or a state or political subdivision thereof .... " 
The hiring practices of municipalities, police departments, and state schools, among 
others, were therefore exempt. In 1972, the Act was amended to cover academic 
institutions and public employment. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, §§ 3, 11, 86 Stat. 103, 103-04, III (codified at 42 U.S.c. 
§§ 2000e-l, 16 (1982»; see also Bartholet, supra note 15, at 980; H.R. REP. No. 238, 
92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2137, 
2140-41 (House Report Statement of Purposes expressed concern that women are 
continually relegated to lesser positions despite the enactment of Title VII in 1964). 
19. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, §§ 3, 11,86 Stat. 
103, 103-04, III (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l, 16 (1982». 
20. 118 Congo Rec. 3802 (1972). 
Id. 
21. [d. 
[O]ne of the things that those discriminated against have resented the most 
is that they are relegated to the position of the sawers of wood and drawers 
of water; that only blue collar jobs and ditch digging jobs are reserved for 
them; and that . . . they cannot ascend the higher rungs in professional 
and other life. 
22. See, e.g., Faro V. New York Univ., 502 F.2d 1229, 1232 (2d Cir. 1974) (education 
and faculty appointments at the university level are probably the least suited for 
federal supervision); Vuyanich V. Republic Nat'l Bank, 505 F. Supp. 224, 370-75 
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a common law employer-employee relationship23 as a prerequisite to ap-
plying the statute.24 For example, in Tyler v. Vickery25 the Fifth Circuit 
used this limitation in dismissing a class action discrimination suit filed 
on behalf of all black applicants who had failed the Georgia bar examina-
tion.26 The bar applicants argued that the testing procedures violated the 
Title VII standards governing employment testing.27 The court held that 
Title VII did not apply because the bar examiners were not "employers" 
or an "employment agency."28 
Some courts similarly limited the application of Title VII in partner-
ship cases. By narrowly defining who was an "employee" under the stat-
ute, a question was raised as to whether a partner could be considered an 
employee of a partnership. Title VII itself provides little assistance in 
this determination; it defines, somewhat circuitously, an "employee" as 
an "individual employed by an employer."29 The Seventh Circuit, in 
Burke v. Friedman,30 considered this issue when it affirmed the dismissal 
of a discrimination case against an accounting firm. 3 1 The plaintiff, an 
associate with the firm, had charged that the defendant partnership dis-
criminated against her in the conditions of her employment and in her 
wrongful discharge.32 The court held, however, that traditional partner-
ship principles33 would preclude a finding that a partner was an "em-
ployee" for Title VII purposes. 34 This determination enabled the 
(N.D. Tex. 1980) (validation standards should be relaxed for upper level bank jobs); 
Cussler v. University of Md., 430 F. Supp. 602, 605-06 (D. Md. 1977) (court pro-
fessed its lack of expertise to apply Title VII in this context); EEOC v. Tufts Inst. of 
Learning, 421 F. Supp. 152, 158 (D. Mass. 1975) (a different standard was applied 
- plaintiffs could prevail only upon a showing of intentional bias or no rational 
basis for selection policy). 
23. Title VII does not provide a definition for the employer-employee relationship. This 
allows for a liberal construction to better effectuate the statute's purpose to eradicate 
the evils of employment discrimination. Some courts use the "economic-realities" 
test. See Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1336, 1340-41 (6th Cir. 1983); Sibley 
Memorial Hospital v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1340-42 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Others 
have adopted the common "right to control" test. See Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 
F.2d 826, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
24. See Comment, Applicability of Title VII to the Partnership Selection Process, 34 
MERCER L. REV. 1579, 1579-80 (1983). 
25. 517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 940 (1976). 
26. [d. 
27. [d. at 1095. 
28. [d. at 1096 (42 U.S.c. § 2ODOe is limited to an "employer," "employment agency," 
or "labor organization"); accord Kyles v. Calcasieu Parish Sheriff's Dep't, 395 F. 
Supp. 1307, 1310 (W.D. La. 1975). 
29. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e(t) (1982). 
30. 556 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977). 
31. [d. at 868. 
32. [d. 
33. A partnership is the result of a voluntary association of two or more persons. UNIF. 
PARTNERSHIP ACT § 6, 6 U.L.A. 22 (1969). Section 6 of the Act defines "partner-
ship" as an "association of two or more persons to carryon as co-owners [of] a 
business for profit." [d. (Emphasis added.) 
34. 556 F.2d at 869 ("we do not see how partners can be regarded as employees rather 
than as employers who own and manage the operation of the business"). 
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defendant partnership to fall within the exemption excluding employers 
with "less than fifteen employees"35 from application of Title VII. An 
interpretation such as this also prevents an associate's advancement to a 
partnership position from being considered an "employment opportu-
nity" covered by Title VII: If partners are not employees, discrimination 
in the selection of a partner would not be discrimination with respect to a 
potential "employment" relationship and, accordingly, would not violate 
the mandates of Title VII.36 
In other circumstances, however, courts have been less antagonistic 
toward the application of Title VII to partnerships. For example, most 
courts have had little difficulty finding that an associate is an "employee" 
under the statute.37 The court in EEOC v. Rinella & Rinella38 rejected 
the defendant's contention that because of the independence of its associ-
ate attorneys, their status was more like that of independent contractors 
than that of "employees." In its holding, the court made it clear that the 
professional nature of a law partnership was not a bar to the jurisdiction 
of Title VII.39 Similarly, courts have found that for Title VII purposes, 
the scope of discovery in cases alleging discrimination in law partner-
ships is to be as comprehensive as in other discrimination cases.40 
A significant ruling on the application of Title VII to the partner-
ship selection process is Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore. 41 There, the 
plaintiff, an Italian Catholic attorney, alleged that he was denied promo-
tion to partnership because of his "national origin or religion or both."42 
This discrimination purportedly was manifested in terms of his assign-
ments, work opportunities, and the firm's failure to make him partner.43 
The court denied the defendant law firm's motions to dismiss the case, 
determining that the statutory language of Title VII was to be given the 
broadest possible scope.44 The court reasoned that the opportunity to be 
35. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e(b) (1982). 
36. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1028 (II th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. 
Ct. 2229 (1984). 
37. See, e.g., Kohn v. Royall, Koegel & Wells, 496 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir. 1974); Lucido v. 
Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Blank v. Sullivan & 
Cromwell, 418 F. Supp. I (S.D. N.Y. 1975); EEOC v. Rinella & Rinella, 401 F. 
Supp. 175 (N.D. Ill. 1975). 
38. 401 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Ill. 1975). 
39. [d. at 180. 
40. See Kohn v. Royall, Koegel & Wells, 496 F.2d 1094, 1100-01 (2d Cir. 1974) (adopt-
ing a broad scope approach to discovery in Title VII). But see Hishon v. King & 
Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1025-26 (lith Cir. 1982) (court, concerned about the pri-
vacy of the parties, found that discovery requests might intrude on attorney-client 
confidentiality), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2229 (1984). See generally Note, Applicability of 
Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation to the Selection of a Law Partner, 76 MICH. 
L. REV. 282, 307 (1977) (privacy concerns and the highly subjective criteria in-
volved are not unique to the selection of partners). 
41. 425 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
42. [d. at 127. 
43. [d. 
44. [d. at 126. For cases broadly construing Title VII, see supra note 14. 
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considered for a job that is not included within the protection of Title 
VII - that is, a partner in a law firm - was not a bar to the statute's 
application if that opportunity was a "term, condition, or privilege" of 
the plaintiff's current employment.45 The court then held that the prom-
ise of considering petitioner for partnership was a "term, condition, or 
privilege" of his employment.46 As to the defendant's argument that the 
application of Title VII infringed upon the partnership's first amendment 
freedom of association rights, the court found that these rights were lim-
ited to political, social, and economic goals, which were not affected by 
the decision.47 Finally, regarding the subjective nature of judgments in-
herent in the partnership selection process, the court stated that Title VII 
only limits consideration of factors it declares unlawful - "race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin" - and still allows for discretionary deci-
sionmaking in the choice of a partner. 48 
The Hishon trial court and the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit declined to follow the reasoning in Lucido and similar cases in-
terpreting Title VII.49 The circuit court rejected the argument, raised in 
Lucido, that the opportunity to be admitted to partnership was a term, 
condition, or privilege of employment as an associate. 50 In reference to 
the female attorney's argument comparing corporations to large partner-
ships, the court stated that it did not "presume to exalt form over sub-
stance," but, in this case, the form was the substance.51 The court 
concluded that the requisite congressional intent was lacking to justify 
application of Title VII to the voluntary association of a business part-
nership. The court was therefore unwilling to categorize partnership se-
lection as a promotion,52 and dismissed the associate's claims. 53 
45. Lucido, 425 F. Supp. at 128; accord Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 
168, 188 (1973). In Golden State Bottling, the Court observed: "The Act's remedies 
are not thwarted by the fact that an employee who is within the Act's protections 
when the discrimination occurs would have been promoted or transferred to a posi-
tion not covered by the Act if he had not been discriminated against." Id. at 188 
(quoting NLRB v. Bell Aircraft Corp., 206 F.2d 235, 237 (2d Cir. 1953». 
46. Lucido, 425 F. Supp. at 128-29. 
47. Id. at 129. 
48.Id. 
49. Hishon, 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1303, 1305-06 (N.D. Ga. 1980), affd, 678 
F.2d 1022, 1029 (lith Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2229 (1984). 
50. Id. at 1029. The court also did not "quarrel with the premise that an 'opportunity' 
can include promotion to a position beyond that of an 'employee' covered by Title 
VII." The court concluded, however, that the discussion of these issues in Lucido 
was dicta. Id. 
5!. Id. at 1028. One theory advanced by the female attorney was that a partnership was 
similar to a corporation and, like corporations, should be viewed as an entity sepa-
rate from its individual members. The court rejected this theory, finding "a clear 
distinction between employees of a corporation and partners of a law firm." Id. But 
cf Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974) (for purposes of fifth amendment, 
partnership has an independent identity, so that partner could not invoke the privi-
lege for partnership records). 
52. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1028 (lith Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 
2229 (1984). 
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In Hishon v. King & Spalding,54 the Supreme Court found the asso-
ciate to have various cognizable claims under Title VII. 55 First, the 
Court explained that in a Title VII context an employment contract may 
arise quite informally. 56 Once a contract was established, any promise by 
the firm to consider the female associate for partnership became a "term, 
condition, or privilege" of her employment as an associate. 57 In the 
event of such a promise Title VII prohibits the law firm from making 
partnership decisions in a discriminatory manner. 58 The Court also 
found that even absent an employment contract, the opportunity to be 
considered for partnership was a "benefit" or "privilege" of the associ-
ate's employment. 59 Once the firm voluntarily offered to provide that 
"benefit," it could not then be "doled out in a discriminatory fashion."60 
The Court thus reasoned that partnership selection, whether considered 
a "term," "condition," "privilege," of "benefit" of an associate's employ-
ment, is subject to Title VII's requirements. 
Moreover, whether promotion to partner was viewed as a contrac-
tual provision of employment or a noncontractual "privilege," the Court 
stated that the firm's "up or out policy" directly affected the attorney's 
status as an employee. 61 The Court found support for this in an associ-
ate's expectation of being considered for partnership at the end of the 
associate's "apprenticeship," combined with the termination that follows 
upon not being chosen. Additionally, lawyers outside the firm are not so 
routinely considered for partnership.62 These factors, the Court held, led 
inexorably to the conclusion that partnership consideration was a "term, 
condition, or privilege" of an associate's employment at the law firm.63 
53. Id. at 1026, 1027. But see County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 178 
(1981) (federal courts must "avoid interpretations of Title VII that deprive victims 
of discrimination of a remedy, without clear congressional mandate"). As to the 
attorney's claim that under the firm's "up or out" policy her failure to make partner 
constituted a discharge, thereby causing her situation to fall within Title vn, the 
court stated that the argument was an "attempted entry through the proverbial back 
door." 678 F.2d at 1029. This issue was the basis of Judge Tjoflat's dissent. Id. at 
1030 (Tjoflat J., dissenting) ("when the partnership decision inextricably and inevi-
tably is a decision whether to terminate employment ... Title VII applies"). 
54. 104 S. Ct. 2229 (1984). 
55. Id. at 2236. 
56. Id. at 2233. "[A]n informal contract of employment may arise by the simple act of 
handing a job applicant a shovel and providing a workplace." Id. 
57. Id. The Court noted that Title VII also may be "relevant in the absence of an 
existing employment relationship," however, not with respect to the "terms, condi-
tions, or privileges" provision focused on in the case at hand. !d. at 2233 n.5. 
58. Id. at 2234 (decision must be made without regard to sex). 
59. Such "benefits" are those aspects of employment that form the relationship between 
the employer and its employees. Id. (citing Allied Chern. & Alkali Workers v. Pitts-
burg Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 178 (1971». 
60. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 104 S. Ct. 2229, 2234 (1984). 
61. !d. "[T]he importance of the partnership decision to a lawyer's status as an associ-
ate is underscored by the allegation that associates' employment is terminated if 
they are not elected to become partners." Id. 
62.Id. 
63.Id. 
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The Court, in deciding that any possible discriminatory effects were 
linked to an associate's status as an employee, found it unnecessary to 
determine whether an offer of partnership was itself an offer of employ-
ment. Because the benefit a plaintiff is denied need not be employment to 
fall within Title VII's protection,64 it did not matter that the benefit 
would accrue after one's employment in a position was terminated.65 
Accordingly, the Court held that any change in status that partnership 
might entail does not preclude the protection of Title VII.66 
Furthermore, the Court found nothing in the legislative history of 
Title VII to support the law firm's argument that Congress intended to 
exempt law partnerships from application of Title VII.67 Instead, the 
Court held that upon weighing the interests of Title VII against a part-
nership's freedom of association rights, Title VII must prevail when a 
conflict occurs.68 The Court therefore concluded that Title VII provided 
the female associate with a cause of action upon which she had a right to 
prove her allegations. 69 
In a concurring opinion,70 Justice Powell narrowly construed the 
scope of the majority opinion. He indicated that it was limited in appli-
cation to an associate as an employee and to a partnership in its role as 
an employer. 71 He emphasized that management decisions and other 
traditional partnership activities are not subject to Title VII scrutiny. 72 
He acknowledged that constitutional rights of association may be limited 
in the face of "invidious private discrimination,"73 but found the issue in 
64. !d. at 2235. 
65. Citing a recent Supreme Court decision, Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax De-
ferred Annuity & Conferred Compensation Plans v. Norris, 103 S. Ct. 3492 (1983), 
the Court compared the partnership benefit to pensions, which qualify as terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, after employment terminates. 104 S. Ct. at 
2235; cf NLRB v. Bell Aircraft Corp., 206 F.2d 235, 237 (2d Cir. 1953) (employee's 
"prospects for promotion [are] among the conditions of his employment"). 
66. Hishon, 104 S. Ct. at 2235 (citing Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 
123 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); see supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
67. 104 S. Ct. at 2235 & nn.IO-11. The Court found nothing to support a per se exemp-
tion. "When Congress wanted to grant an employer complete immunity, it ex-
pressly did so." Id; accord County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 178 
(1981). 
68. Hisholl, 104 S. Ct. at 2235. The Court remarked: .. '[i]nvidious private discrimina-
tion may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected 
by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional 
protections.''' !d. (quoting Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470 (1973)); see 
also Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 178 (1976) (freedom to associate does not 
make either the association or its members immune from reasonable governmental 
regulation), cited with approval ill Hisholl, 104 S. Ct. at 2235-36. Moreover, the 
Hisholl Court stated that respondent did not show how its lawyering activities 
would be inhibited by the requirement that it consider petitioner for partner on her 
merits. Id. at 2235. 
69. Hishon, 104 S. Ct. at 2236. 
70. Id. at 2236-37 (Powell, J., concurring). 
71. Id. at 2236 (Powell, J., concurring). 
72. Id. at 2236 & n.3 (Powell, J., concurring). 
73. Id. at 2236 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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this case limited to contractual obligations voluntarily assumed by the 
partnership.74 Constitutional rights of association were therefore not im-
plicated. Powell inferred, however, that in a similar case, on its merits, 
some deference to constitutional rights of association might be 
appropriate. 75 
The decision in Hishon v. King & Spa/ding reaffirms the Court's po-
sition that Title VII is a broad remedial measure, intended to prohibit all 
practices that create inequality in employment opportunity.76 Yet, be-
cause Hishon was not a decision on the merits, the Court did not examine 
all the issues surrounding Title VII's application to partnership selec-
tion. 77 Nor did the Court specifically define freedom of association rights 
in the context of businesses and partnerships. It did make it clear, how-
ever, that those rights may not be asserted to avoid the constraints of 
Title VII. 
Perhaps the most apparent issue left unresolved is whether a partner 
may be considered an "employee" for Title VII purposes.78 As it stands, 
in the case of a law firm associate denied an offer of partnership, the 
scope of Title VII has been extended to protect only those associates em-
ployed in a partnership career track. The Court, however, chose not to 
decide whether becoming a partner is itself an employment opportu-
nity.79 Thus, the holding is too narrow for application either to a firm's 
lateral selection of partners or to the allocation of assignments and privi-
leges among partners. 80 
Notwithstanding the limited nature of the opinion, the immediate 
effect of Hishon may be far-reaching. Title VII prohibits discrimination 
based not only on "sex," bu't also based on "race, color, religion, or na-
tionalorigin."81 The "terms, conditions, and privileges" of an associate's 
position include possibilities not considered in Hishon, such as work as-
74. Id. at 2236 (Powell, J., concurring). 
75. See id. at 2237 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring). 
76. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976). 
77. Other issues include problems foreseeably arising in discovery requests regarding 
questions of confidentiality and attorney-client privileges. But see Bellis v. United 
States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974) (regarding partner's fifth amendment privilege during a 
discovery request, the Court held that an entity is not immunized from statutory or 
constitutional limitations by its choice of organization). See generally Note, supra 
note 40. 
78. One argument presented by the female attorney in her complaint was that the law 
partnership was a separate legal entity from its partners and, therefore, should be 
considered the "employer" of the partners. See Appellant's Petition for Writ of Cer-
tiorari at 12-13, Hishon v. King & Spalding, 104 S. Ct. 2229 (1984). This argument 
was rejected by the court of appeals, Hishon, 678 F.2d 1022, 1026 (11 th Cir. 1982), 
rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2229 (1984), and, according to Justice Powell, "[t]he reasoning of 
the Court's opinion does not require that the relationship among partners be charac-
terized as an 'employment' relationship to which Title VII would apply." 104 S. Ct. 
at 2236 (Powell, J., concurring). 
79. Hishon, 104 S. Ct. at 2235. 
80. Hishon, 104 S. Ct. at 2236 (Powell, J., concurring). 
81. See supra note 5. 
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signments, evaluation processes, and delays in partnership consideration. 
In addition, although a partnership still has the discretion to choose new 
partners among qualified candidates, it must be prepared to show that 
the decision is not based on unlawful criteria.82 Because of the highly 
subjective criteria used in personnel selection, however, it is also likely 
that the courts will require plaintiffs to introduce direct evidence of dis-
crimination, and to demonstrate that the employee in the past had been 
evaluated favorably in terms of legitimate sUbjective criteria. 83 
As more women, blacks, and other disadvantaged classes continue 
to enter the practice of law, Hishon's effect may be, at long last, to in-
crease the number of partnerships offered to those who are qualified, 
without regard to race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. If greater 
numbers of associates are females, the percentage of women who become 
partners should increase. Had the Court ruled any other way, profes-
sional groups could avoid equal employment legislation simply by their 
choice of organization.84 Instead, the Court maintained its commitment 
to equal protection. As stated by Justice Powell in his concurrence, 
"[l]aw firms - and, of course, society - are better for these changes."85 
Marjorie H. Wax 
82. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981) (even if 
Title VII applied to partnership decisions, "the employer has discretion to choose 
among equally qualified candidates [or to choose the most qualified], provided the 
decision is not based upon unlawful criteria"). 
83. See generally Bartholet, Application a/Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. 
REV. 945 (1982); Note, supra note 40, at 303-07 (discussing the effects of Title VII 
on an employer's use of subjective criteria in promotion decisions). 
84. As stated by one commentator, "the partnership form of organization should not 
furnish a shield to avoid compliance with Title VII." Note, Tenure and Partnership 
as Title VII Remedies, 94 HARV. L. REV. 457, 476 (1980). 
85. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 104 S. Ct. 2229, 2237 (1984) (Powell, J., com:urring). 
